

# Security and Privacy Implications of URL Shortening Services

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# Definitions

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- **Short URL** does not exceed 35 characters
- **Shortened URL** belongs to a shortening service
- Corner cases:
  - ▶ Shortened URL but not short:  
`http://urlshorteningservicefortwitter.com/4czyx`
  - ▶ Short URL but not shortened:  
`http://www.google.de/search?q=IEEE`

# The Problem

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- Long URLs tend to wrap (especially in mail)
- Twitter is restricted to 140 characters
- URLs in books should be short
- User tracking and statistics
  
- “Solution”: URL shortening services (USS)

# Technical Description

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1. User posts long URL to service  
`http://itsec.rwth-aachen.de/research`
2. Service generates short URL  
`http://nvg8.it/8b896c`
3. Other user requests short URL
4. Server responds HTTP 301 or 302
5. Other user is redirected to long URL

# Downsides

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- Link destination is not transparent
- Reachability of the service is not guaranteed
- USS can silently stop working  
⇒ All shortened URLs defunct
- Request is delayed when connection to USS has high latency
- Service might be hacked and redirect to malware
- Service might be hostile and serve malware to vulnerable browsers
- Secret URLs submitted to USS cannot be deleted
- ...

# Facts many users do not know

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- URL service accumulates click statistics and creates profiles of users
- Short links might vanish after a few years
- When the USS dies, all shortened URLs are dysfunctional
- When the USS is hacked, links might point to other websites (malware, porn, violence, ...)
- Short URLs can be enumerated  
⇒ All submitted URLs are public(!)

# Research Objectives

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- Analyze risks for clients, servers, and privacy of users
- Empirical studies:
  1. Determine popular USS on Twitter
  2. Analyze the use of USS in spam
  3. Test for malicious services
  4. Analyze user tracking abilities
  5. Enumerate shortened URLs
  6. Submit honeypot URLs to USS
  7. Test latency and availability of popular USS



# Preliminaries: List of USS

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## Sources:

- Firefox add-on *ShortenURL*
- List of USS on [longurl.org](http://longurl.org) (URL expansion service)
- Lists of USS on several blogs
- Hostnames of URLs in Spam E-Mails

Leads to list of 610 USS (distinct host names), includes 527 general purpose USS.

0lv.ru	clickmeter.com	fwib.net	kurl.nu	nn.nf	retwt.me	snipurl.com	twhub.com	urlz.at
0rz.tw	clickthru.ca	get.sfu.ca	kurzurl.net	notifyurl.com	rickroll.it	snkr.me	twip.us	urlzen.com
1link.in	cli.gs	get-	k.vu	notlong.com	r.im	snurl.com	twirl.at	usat.ly
1url.com	clk.my	shorty.com	l9k.net	not.my	ri.ms	sokrati.ru	twitclicks.com	use.my
23o.net	cl.lk	get-	lanjut.in	n.pr	riz.gd	song.ly	twitterpan.com	to
2big.at	cl.ly	url.com	lat.ms	nsfw.in	rmse.ru	sp2.ro	twitterurl.net	vb.ly
2.gp	clop.in	gizmo.do	liip.to	nutshellurl.com	rnk.me	spedro.com	twitterurl.org	vdirect.com
2.ly	coge.la	gkurl.us	liltex.com	nvg8.it	rnm.me	surl.it	twittu.ms	v.gd
2su.de	c-o.in	gl.am	lin.cr	nxy.in	rt.nu	srnk.net	twiturl.de	vgn.am
2tu.us	conta.cc	go2cut.com	lin.io	nyti.ms	rubyurl.com	srs.li	twtr.us	vi.ly
2ya.com	cort.as	go2.me	linkbee.com	oobeyasui.com	ru.ly	starturl.com	twurl.cc	vl.am
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301.to	crks.me	good.ly	linkee.com	odun.net	rww.tw	su.pr	u28.de	voomr.com
301url.com	crum.pl	goo.gl	linkl.ru	omf.gd	s4c.in	surl.co.uk	u6e.de	vtc.es
307.to	ctvr.us	go.qb.by	linkslice.com	om.ly	s7y.us	surl.hu	u76.org	w3t.org
3.ly	curio.us	goshrink.com	link.toolbot.com	omoikane.net	safe.mn	ta.gd	ub0.cc	w55.de
4ms.me	cut.im	gourl.gr	linxfix.com	on.cnn.com	sai.ly	tbd.ly	uforgot.me	wapo.st
4sq.com	cutt.us	go.usa.gov	liteurl.net	on.mktw.net	sdt.us	t.co	uik.in	wapurl.co.uk
4url.cc	cuturls.com	gowat.ch	liurl.cn	ooqx.com	services.digg.com	uorn.ch	uiop.me	webalias.com
5.gp	daa.li	g.ro.lt	lnk.by	orz.se	sfu.ca	tgr.me	ulimit.com	weturl.com
6url.com	dai.ly	gurl.es	lnkd.in	ow.ly	shar.es	tgr.ph	ulu.lu	w.hurl.ws
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abbr.com	digg.com	hmm.ph	lnk.sk	pic.gd	shortenurl.com	tinuri.com	urizy.com	xlurl.net
abcurl.net	digipills.com	ho.io	lnkurl.com	piko.me	shorterlink.com	tinini.us	url360.me	xr.com
adf.ly	disq.us	hop.im	ln-s.net	ping.fm	shorterlink.co.uk	tinurl.mobi	url4.eu	xrl.in
adjix.com	dld.bz	hosturl.com	ln-s.ru	pipes.yahoo.com	short.ie	tiny123.com	url9.com	xrl.us
ad.vu	dlvr.it	hotredirect.com	tookleap.com	piurl.com	shortio.com	tinyyarro.ws	urlac.com	x.se
afx.cc	dn.vc	href.in	low.cc	pli.gs	shortlinks.co.uk	tiny.by	url.ag	xsm.us
a.gd	doiop.com	hsblinks.com	l.pr	plumurl.com	shortn.me	tiny.cc	urlao.com	xs.to
a.gg	do.my	htxt.it	lru.jp	plurl.me	short.to	tinylink.com	url.az	xurl.es
aisr.us	dopen.us	hub.tm	lt.tl	p.ly	shorturl.com	tinylink.in	urlbee.com	xurl.jp
all.fuseurl.com	durl.me	huff.to	lurl.no	pnt.me	shorturl.de	tiny.ly	urlbit.us	x.vu
alturl.com	durl.com	hulu.com	macte.ch	politi.co	shoturl.us	tiny.pl	urlborg.com	xxsurl.de
amzn.to	dwarfurl.com	hurl.it	makeashorterlink.com	plodro.com	shout.to	tinypl.us	urlbrief.com	yahoo.it
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
# Results

# Determine Popular USS on Twitter

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
- Base: Two samples of Twitter messages (24 hours each, max 10%)
- Results:
  - ▶ 7.5 million / 8.7 million messages
  - ▶ 1.2 million / 1.1 million URLs
  - ▶ 553,320 / 431,636 shortened URLs
- Top ten services (cover 96% of all USS on Twitter):
  1. bit.ly / j.mp
  2. t.co
  3. tinyurl.com
  4. goo.gl
  5. ow.ly
  6. dlvr.it
  7. is.gd
  8. migre.me
  9. dld.bz
  10. lnk.ms

# Top ten services



- Spam e-mails from SCHNUCKI project
- 7.9 million e-mails collected since 2003
- 12.8 million URLs, 0.3 % shortened URLs
- Query shortened URLs and analyze response code
- Calculate spam detection rate for relevant services

# Spam detection rate of USS



# Malicious USS

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Attack scenario: Setup a fast and attractive USS, serve all requests normally, but after a while start sending vulnerable browsers to malware sites.

Analysis:

- Query shortened URLs seen on Twitter for 187 different USS with 83 different User-Agent strings
- Analyze HTTP response Location header
- Result: No malicious behaviour found
- But: One service handles browsers different




# User-Tracking USS

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- Data from previous experiment
- Analyze HTTP response Set-Cookie header
- Results:
  - ▶ 65 USS set cookies
  - ▶ 38 USS set persistent cookies
  - ▶ 28 USS set persistent cookies with validity period 6 months or more
- Define  $Q$  as quotient:  $\frac{\# \text{all unique values}}{\# \text{all values}}$  received for the cookie

# Validity period of cookies




# Enumerating shortened URLs

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
For the top ten USS:

- Analyze structure of shortened URLs in both Twitter samples  
⇒ character frequency analysis using heatmaps
- Select range, ca. 230k URLs per USS
- Enumerate all URLs in range
- Inspect results by hand, search for secret URLs
  
- Observation: Only `goo.gl` imposed restrictions

# Character frequency analysis: bit.ly




# Character frequency analysis: tinyurl.com




# Character frequency analysis: goo.gl


character frequency of 31,065 goo.gl URLs



character frequency of 24,918 goo.gl URLs



# Character frequency analysis: dld.bz



# Secret URLs found by enumerating

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- Archives of private photos
- Several CVs
- Treasurer's report for a company
- List of names and numbers of a kindergarten in Lindlar
- ...



# Submitting secret URLs to USS

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- Question: Are secret URLs submitted to USS leaked?
- Set up honeypot web server
- Generate unique URLs for each service
- Suspicious and harmless URLs
- Examples:
  - ▶ `http://fd0.me/secret/a0df29ac/bb42ce8b`
  - ▶ `http://www.fd0.me/blog/archive/2011/01/14/index.php?article=69e325eb#a5a6c61c`
- Submit to 255 USS
- Watch for requests

## Results (after four weeks)

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
- Honeypot is found by Google, Yahoo and Baidu
- 15 URLs requested by Google
- 13 URLs requested by Yahoo
- 2 URLs requested by Baidu
- 13 URLs manually checked by USS administrators (9 transmitted the admin URL in the HTTP referrer)
- Four administrators contacted us, are interested in the research
- ⇒ Never submit private URLs to shortening services!

# Latency and availability measurements


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- Latency and availability measured with Smokeping
- From two different servers (in Germany)
- ICMP and HTTP latency measured for ten services
- Results:
  - ▶ Most services have good average HTTP latency
  - ▶ Some services have a very bad worst-case HTTP latency
  - ▶ `goo.gl` USS wins

## Average ICMP/HTTP Latency



## Maximum ICMP/HTTP Latency



# Conclusion

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- USS have risks
- These risks are very real
- USS leak URLs to search engines
- Do not submit private URLs to USS
- USS are used in spam e-mails
- Several services set long-running cookies and can track the user
- Shortened URLs are not completely random
- `goo.gl` USS dominates all others in every discipline

# Questions?

# Thank you for your attention.